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NOTES AND COMMENTS

When courts and lawyers venture into the field of public policy
in order to determine the law, they are venturing on to uncertain and dangerous ground. After all, one of the elementary principles of justice is that the law be certain in order that one may conform his conduct with some assurance of being right. No greater injustice can be done than to leave the meaning of a statute to the
capriciousness of the man who happens to be on the bench and to
his ideas of public policy.
Recently we have seen a great deal of law perverted and made uncertain by the tendency of courts to use "public policy" as a basis
for determination of the law. In such cases we are no longer dealing
in law but in politics, economics and philosophy. How far afield are
we lawyers getting when we must seek the law in the type of citations
which you used to support your comments in many instances? For
example: Note 2. "Tiller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining";
Note 10-"Report of Commission on Industrial Relations in Great
Britain"; Note 19--"N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1939, p. 2, col. 2"; Note 20"50 United Mine Workers Journal 18"; Note 21-"49 Mon. Lab. Rev.
693"; Note 24--"Personal correspondence with Thomas C. Billig, Assistant to General Counsel Federal Security Agency." I have always felt that
the law should be more certain and definite than the variegated political, economic and philosophical opinions contained in the above type
of publications.
It seems to be that in grading the papers of applicants for admission to the bar I find an increasing tendency to answer a question on the basis of the public policy involved. To me this appears
to be a method of avoiding the more diifficult process of legal reasoning.
What I have said about courts attempting to assume the role of
the legislature and changing the law is applicable to the way the
Supreme Court of the United States has nullified the Interstate
Commerce Clause to the extent that today all commerce is in effect
subject to regulation by congress and the word "interstate" serves
no purpose in the clause. A constitutional amendment was the proper
way to make this change, but apparently the Supreme Court felt that
public policy warranted its making the change.
I am not in the habit of writing letters to editors or congressmen
and it is not my intention that this letter be construed as an objection to the publishing of your comment; I merely oppose your reasoning. I do think, however, that the comment should bear the name of
the person responsible for the editorial statements therein.
Norman F. Arterburn
of the Vincennes Bar.

INSOLVENT ESTATES
RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWING SHAREHOLDER IN BUILDING &
LOAN ASSOCIATION.
Plaintiff, shareholder in a building and loan association gave
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notice of withdrawal as authorized by statute.,
Five years later
the association was declared insolvent and plaintiff's claim still remained unpaid. A decree denying plaintiff priority over remaining
stockholders was reversed on appeal.2 The association having failed
to prove insolvency at the time of withdrawal, solvency was presumed.
Solvency of a building and loan association s at the time withdrawal notice becomes effective determines the priority status of a
withdrawing shareholder. 4 If the association is insolvent at the time,
notice of withdrawal becomes effective in accordance with statutory
provision, the withdrawing member receiving no preference over his
fellow members.5
If the association is solvent at that time, the
withdrawing shareholder is entitled to priority. However, considerable
confusion exists in defining the exact status of such withdrawing
shareholder.6 There is substantial authority for the court's position
that the withdrawing stockholder of a solvent association becomes a
"creditor."7 Other cases hold that his status remains that of a share1 IND. STAT. ANN. Burns, 1933) § 18-2109.

"Any stockholder ...
whose
stock is unpledged for a loan, wishing to withdraw from such
association, may do so, upon three months' notice in writing to
the board of directors, when such stockholder shall be entitled
to receive the full amount of dues paid in upon the stock to be

2

withdrawn, together with . . . , and less . . .

Fuzy v. Department of Financial Institutions, Ind. App. -,
37 N.E. (2d) 24 (1941).
3 "A building and loan association is 'insolvent' when its assets have
depreciated to a value less than the amount which the association
has already received from members as payments for their stock."
Note (1933) 42 YALE L.J. 931, 932; see 12 c..T.s. 528 § 110. See
also, Wagner v. Farm & Home Saving & Loan Ass'n of Missouri,
138 Mo. 313, 315, 90 S.W. (2d) 93, 97 (1936).
IMott v. Western Savings & Loan Ass'n., 142 Ore. 344, 20 P. (2d)
236 (1933); Fielis v. Henry R. Edmunds Buliding & Loan Ass'n.,
336 Pa. Super. 32, 9 A. (2d) 906 (1939).
5
Allman v. David Berg Building & Loan Ass'n., 100 Pa. Super. 205
(1930); SUNDHEIM,

LAW OF BUILDING .AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

(3d

ed.) §110; Note (1933) 42 YALE L.J. 931, 938. Insolvency may
be interpreted strictly or as in Stone v. New Schiller Building &
Loan Ass'n., 302 Pa. Super. 544, 133 Atl. 758 (1931) (If the
association has not been declared insolvent, or is not in the hands
of a receiver, but is "potentially" insolvent when notice is given,
the rule is the same as in the case of actual insolvency).
6 Enterprise Building & Loan Society v. Balin, 55 Pac. 740 (Calif. 1898).
The seeming confusion arises because most states provide that only
a fixed percentage of funds on hand may be devoted to withdrawals. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN.

(Purdon, 1931)

tit. 15, §§911,

991;

N.J. COMP. (1910) 347, §§ 38, 39. Under such statutes a withdrawing member may have right to withdraw but still not be entitled to
judgment for amount due him. See Freedman, The Right of Withdrawal From Building and Loan Associations (1930) 5 TEMPLE L.Q.
79 passim.
7 Gross v. Citizens Mutual Building Associations, Inc., 190 S.E. (2d) 298
(Va. 1937); Griffin v. White, 182 S.C. 225, 189 S.E. 127 (1936);
Gilbert v. Beacon Hill Credit Union, 287 Mass. 493, 192 N.E. 25
(1934); Mott v. Western Savings & Loan Ass'n., 143 Ore. 344, 20
P. (2d) 236 (1933).
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holder.8 A more equitable treatment of the withdrawing shareholder
places him in an intermediate position between full creditor and mere
shareholder. 9 Such individuals have been involved in corporate action
to a greater extent than the general creditor and may be said to be
in some measure responsible for the insolvent status of the corporation. Yet while the corporation was solvent they withdrew from it.
Therefore, such withdrawing shareholders should not be required to
bear losses and liabilities arising after their withdrawal.' 0
Since plaintiff's recovery depends on the solvency of the Association at the time of withdrawal, it might seem that he should have
the burden of proving solvency as a part of his cause of action."
However, in accord with the holding in the instant case,12 recent decis Clardy v. Jefferson Co. Buildin & Loan Ass'n., 234 Ala. 658, 176
So. 368 (1937); State ex rel. Wagner v. Farm & Home Savings
& Loan Ass'n. of Missouri, 338 Mo. 313, 90 S.W. (2d) 93 (1936);
Petition of Philadelphia Inv. Building & Loan Assn., 121 Pa.
Super. 148, 183 Atl. 93 (1936). In a suit to recover the withdrawal value of five shares in a building and loan association the
plaintiff obtained judgment. Reversed on appeal. The court said,
"It is hardly necessary to state that obtaining of judgment does
not give to a withdrawing stockholder a preference over other,
stockholders in the distribution of the valuable assets of the
association. Moreover, the creditors are first entitled to be paid
before the stockholders." Sanft v. Fair & Square Building & Loan
Ass'n., 313 Pa. 54, 170 Atl. 697 (1934); accord, Columbia Finance
& Trust Co. v. Tharp, 24 Ind. App. 82, 56 N.E. 265 (1900);
Note (1933) 42 YALE L.J. 931, 938. The opinion in the leading
case on the subject, Christians' Appeal, 102 Pa. 184 (1882),
that even a judgment creditor on withdrawal must prorate
with stockholders, should not lead to such a conclusion as a general rule. For there the association was insolvent when notice
was given. See Freedman, The Right of Withdrawal From Building and Loan Associations (1930)

5 TEMPLE L.Q. 79, 93.

9"When a building and loan association becomes insolvent, it may
have creditors who have never been shareholders in the association, and it may have creditors who were shareholders, for example, withdrawing stockholders who have not yet been paid. In
the liquidation the creditors who have been shareholders are
placed, because of the partnership characteristics of such shareholding in a different class from the creditors who have never been
shareholders, and are therefore not entitled to take anything
until the general creditors are paid." In re Beckman, 5 A. (2d)
342 (Pa. 1939); see Glenwood-Progressive Building & Loan Ass'n.,
129 Pa. Super. 249 (1937); Woods v. Wichita Falls Building & Loan
Ass'n., 66 S.W. (2d) 718, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) Contra: Stone
v. Schiller Building & Loan Ass'n., 302 Pa. Super. 544, 153 Atl.
758 (1931); Brown v. Victor Building & Loan Ass'n., 302 Pa. 254,
153 Atl. 349 (1931).
0
1 In re Yonah Building & Loan Ass'n., 133 Pa. Super. 538, 3 A. (2d)
49 (1938) (After stating that a withdrawing shareholder is not a
creditor within the meaning of the assignment laws, the case holds
that such an individual is entitled to a preference over the stockholders who by their representatives are responsible for the leases
which brought about the insolvency of the association.
11
Pacific Coast Savings Society v. Sturdevant, 163 Cal. 627, 133 Pac.
485 (1913).
12 Fuzy v. Department of Financial Institutions, Ind. App. -,
37 N.E. (2d) 24 (1941).
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sions have shifted the burden of proof from the shareholder to the
Association.la As a practical matter this is correct. It is the association which has access and control over the records and it should be
required to see that they are properly kept and preserved.

LEGISLATION
AMENDATORY ACT EFFECTIVE AFTER LAPSE OF ORIGINAL
STATUTE HELD VALID
In 1941 the General Assembly of Indiana attempted to amend
the already twice-amended Milk Control Law of 1935. The amendatory act was passed and approved by the Governor while the original
law was in force and valid. But the Indiana Constitution expressly
provides that a statute, even after being validly passed and approved,
does not become effective until it has been published and circulated
in the counties of the state by authority, unless it contains an emergency clause. IND. CONST. ART. IV, § 28. The present statute contained
no emergency clause, and the Governor did not proclaim its publication until after the original act had expired. Held, the amendatory act
was valid upon its passage and approval, and became effective upon its
publication and proclamation by the Governor. Milk Control Board v.
Pursifull, 36 N.E. (2d) 850 (Ind. 1941).
The rule is well settled in Indiana that an act seeking to amend
a non-existent statute is invalid. Draper v. Falley, 33 Ind. 465 (1870) ;
Kramer v. Beebe, 186 Ind. 349, 115 N.E. 83 (1917); Ross v. Chambers, 214 Ind. 223, 14 N.E. (2d) 1012 (1938).
But the court in the
instant case pointed out that in previous cases involving such amendments, the legislative machinery had not 'been put in motion while
the original act was in existence. The original act had, on the contrary, been previously repealed or judicially declared invalid before
the amendment was attempted. Straus Bros. Co. v. Fisher, 200 Ind.
307, 163 N.E. 205 (1928). The court realistically distinguished a case
almost in point. Metsker v. Whitsell, 181 Ind. 126, 103 N.E. 1078
(1914). That case, which concerned the validity of the first of two
amendatory acts passed at the same session of the General Assembly,
held that it was invalid because the act passed second in point of
time contained an emergency clause and became effective immediately.
Therefore, by the time that the first act was to take effect, the original statute had been amended out of existence by the second act. The
court also based its decision upon the rule that as between two inconsistent acts passed by the same legislature, the one passed subsequently will prevail. The court in the principal case declared that
1

3 In re Bell, 339 Pa. 443, 15 A. (2d) 350 (1940); In re Yonah Building & Loan Ass'n., 133 Pa. Super. 538, 540, 3 A. (2d) 49, 53
(1938). This latter case is clearly analogous to the Fuzy case,
supra, note 12. More than five years had elapsed between the
notice of withdrawal and the insolvency of the association. The
court said that the association undoubtedly thought itself solvent
during the intervening period, but if it was in fact insolvent then
it was the duty of the association to show that the association
was actually insolvent. See also, Gilbert v. Beacon Hill Credit
Union, 287 Mass. 493, 192 N.E. 25 (1934).

